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II
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Jurisdiction is conferred by Title 78, Chapter 2, Section 2,
Subsection (5) U.C.A. authorizing review by the Supreme Court of
Utah

of

the

decisions

of

the

Certiorari and under Subsection

Court

of

Appeals

by Writ

(3)(j) of Section 2.

of

This case

was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to 78-2a-3 (2) (j) U.C.A. after appeal from the District
Court tor Summit County, Utah.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals in a civil quiet title action originally filed and tried
to the Court sitting without a jury in the District Court for
Summit County.

Ill
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the Court of Appeals misapply

the

standard

for

appellate review of the facts in a civil case when it construed
conflicting

facts opposite the findings of fact by the trial

judge.
2.

May the common law doctrine of laches bar a co-tenant

from asserting

rights

to real property

in

litigation

against

another co-tenant.
3.
used

to

May the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel be
prevent

a

defense

against

co-tenant.
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adverse

possession

by

a

4.

May a prescriptive easement be defeated by evidence of

permission to use from a non-owner of the contested land.

IV
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There do not appear to be any constitutional provisions,
statutes,

ordinances,

rules

or

regulations

of

administrative

bodies whose interpretation is determinative, however, the Court
must interpret the provisions of 78-12-7, of the Utah Code which
is set forth below:
"78-12-7
in owner

Adverse possession - possession presumed

In every action for the recovery of real
property, or the possession thereof, the person
establishing a legal title to the property shall
be presumed to have been possessed thereof within
the time required by law; and the occupation of
the property by any other person shall be deemed
to have been under and in subordination to the
legal title, unless it appears that the property
has been held and possessed adversely to such
legal title for seven years before the commencement of this action."
V
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a quiet title case filed by Sweeney Land Company
pursuant

to

the

provisions

of

78-40-1,

Utah

Code

Annotated

against Gilbert and Maud Kimball and Melvin and Peggy Fletcher.
The Kimball's

Counterclaimed

against

Sweeney

and

Crossclaimed

against the Fletchers and the Fletchers1 Crossclaimed and Coun-
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terclaimed against Sweeney Land Company and the Kimballs.
land at issue is principally

The

the rear yard of the Fletcher's

home,
Gilbert and Maud Kimball claimed title based on a 1940 deed
from

Summit

co-tenants

County
and

to

served

Robert Kimball
summons

by

and

Gilbert

publication

parties, including Robert Kimball's successors•

on

Kimball as
all

unnamed

The Fletchers

notified the surviving heir of Robert Kimball of the action and
during the pendancy of the proceedings acquired the interest of
Robert Kimball which had passed to his heir, Elizabeth Kimball.
Trial was held on September 5 and 6th, 1985 to the Court.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Quiet Title
were entered.

The Decree quieted title in Sweeney Land Company

as to a portion of the land, Maud Kimball as the successor to
Gilbert Kimball to a portion of the land and Melvin Fletcher and
Pe

99Y Fletcher to the land upon which their yard, outbuildings

and driveway are located.

(Appendix Exhibit 2 - Summary Chart of

Claims and Decree)
Maud Kimball and Sweeney Land Company appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

The Utah Court of Appeals, in an opinion filed October

3, 1988, held:

That laches barred Melvin and Peggy Fletcher from

asserting the co-tenant interest originating with Robert Kimball
and defending against the adverse possession claim of co-tenant
Maud

Kimball, that estoppel

barred Melvin

Fletcher

and Peggy

Fletcher from asserting the co-tenant interest originating with
Robert

Kimball

and

defending

against

-4-

the

adverse

possession

claims

of

co-tenant

Maud

Kimball, and

that

the

prescriptive

easement claims of the Fletchers failed because Melvin Fletcher's
father had permission to use a parcel of land- which was separate
and unrelated for access to his adjoining property.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March of 1940 Robert W. Kimball and Gilbert J. Kimball
purchased the disputed parcel of land located in Park City from
Summit County.

Robert moved to Salt Lake City in 1940 (trans, p.

205, L.8) and Gilbert continued to live in Park City.
paid

all

$4,641.65

the

property

(Trans, p.

taxes

from

147, L.10).

1940

to

Robert

1983
did

Gilbert

cimounting

not

convey

to
his

interest during his lifetime and remained the record owner of a
50% interest; when he died in 1975 his co-tenant interest passed
to his heir, Elizabeth Kimball.

(Trans, p. 163-164.)

In 1976 and 1977 Gilbert conveyed his 50% co-tenant interest
in the parcel by recording two quit claim deeds from himself to
he and Maud as joint tenants; an original, Appendix Exhibit 5,
and

a correction

deed, Appendix

Exhibit

6.

In

each

deed

acknowledged the purchase by Gilbert and Robert in 1940.
1971

the

county

recorder's

records

indicated

that

he

After

Robert

W.

Kimball owned a 50% interest and that Gilbert and Maud as joint
tenants owned a 50% interest.

(See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 4,

Abstract of Title)
Gilbert took no action to place Robert on notice that he
claimed adversely to Robert at any time. (Appendix Exhibit 7 -
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Deposition of G. Kimball, p. 51-52) Gilbert did not rely on any
action or lack of action by Robert at any time. (Appendix Exhibit
7 - Deposition of G. Kimball p. 51-52) Gilbert and Maud believed
their payment of taxes entitled them to take Robert's interest.
(Appendix Exhibit

7 - Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, p. 52.)

After the purchase of Robert's co-tenant interest from his heir,
Elizabeth, the Fletchers asked the court to quiet title in them
and to Maud Kimball as co-tenants.

Gilbert and Maud claimed to

have adversely possessed against Robert and claimed sole ownership.

The Fletchers also asked that the co-tenant interests be

partitioned as the interests of the parties may appear in the
most logical fashion and tendered payment of the property taxes
by payment in to court.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held
that Gilbert's redemption of the property from a preliminary tax
sale in 1947 was notice to Robert of an adverse claim and gave
rise to a cause of action by Robert.

The Appellate Court held

that Robert's failure to claim his interest from his co-tenant
prior

to

his

death

constituted

unreasonable

prejudicial to Gilbert and Maud Kimball.

delay

conduct

(Appendix Exhibit 1 -

Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals)

VI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review for
the findings of fact by a trial judge.
-6-

The Court of Appeals

totally disregarded the standard which is to review the facts in
the light most favorable to sustaining the findings of the trial
court.

The reviewing court should resolve the interpretation of

conflicting facts to be consistent with the findings of the trial
court.
The Court of Appeals construed conflicting facts completely
opposite the findings of fact by the trial court and found facts
it believed support principles of laches and estoppel.

The court

used its conflicting interpretation of the facts to reverse the
trial judge, disregarding the version of the facts favorable to
the Appellants.
POINT II
Laches may not be asserted to prevent a defense against a
claim

of

adverse

possession

by

a

co-tenant.

The

claimed a co-tenant interest in the disputed parcel.

Appellants
Gilbert and

Maud presented various theories in opposition to the Appellants'
ownership:
1.

That the Appellants were barred from asserting owner-

ship by 78-12-7 and 78-12-12 U.C.A. (Adverse possession)
2.

That a delay in the litigation of Robert's

interest

prevented the Appellants from asserting the co-tenant interest.
3.

That the Appellants were estopped by Robert's failure

to pay taxes from claiming an interest.
The Appellants defended by proving that no notice of adverse
possession or intent to exclude Robert was present, that no event
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occurred giving Robert a legal right adverse to Gilbert and Maud
where Robert or his successor in interest unreasonably delayed
and that Robert's failure to pay taxes gave rise to a claim for
monetary contribution in favor of Gilbert and Maud.
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that laches prevented
the Appellants from defending against the Kimballs1 claims.
POINT III
Under the facts here, estoppel may not bar a co-tenant from
defending against a claim of adverse possession.
The Court of Appeals held that Robert's conduct consisting
of silence, inaction, and a disputed statement refusing to pay
taxes

were

repudiated

by

the

Appellants'

assertion

of

the

co-tenant real property interest.
The Court erred in failing to apply the law defining the
rights of co-tenants in real property matters.

A property owner

can hold title in silence and is not required to take any action
to hold title in real property.
be divested in certain ways.

When title is vested it can only
Robert did not deed the property,

he was not placed on notice of any matter which would give rise
to a cause of action, and the assertion of title by one holding
title cannot be barred by estoppel based on silence and inaction.
POINT IV
The Court of Appeals disregarded the evidence of prescriptive easement
possession.

and mistakenly

applied

the doctrine

The Court below clearly misapplied
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of adverse

the

law with

respect

to prescriptive

prescriptive

easement

by

easements
the

and

the establishment

Appellants.

The

opinion

of a
below

discusses the establishment of prescriptive easements in terms
applying the law of adverse possession.

On page 5 of the opinion

the title of the section of the opinion is "Adverse Possession"
while clearly the Fletchers claim under the findings of the trial
court was a claim for a prescriptive easement.

The Appellate

Court used entirely the wrong standard and evaluated the wrong
issues

with

respect

to

the

findings

establishing a prescriptive easement.

of

the

trial

court

The appellants were never

awarded any property rights by adverse possession and the opinion
of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the findings of
the trial court reinstated with respect to the establishment of
the Fletchers1 prescriptive easement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS VIEW OF THE
FACTS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES FOR
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals literally ignored the Findings of
Fact by the trial court and wrote the facts of this case.

The

standard the Appellate Court should use in reviewing decisions of
a trial court in a quiet title case is stated in Ash v. State
"The appellant is required to sustain the
burden of proving error, and the judgment of the
trial court will not be disturbed if there be
substantial evidence in the record to support it"

1.

Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, (Utah 1977).

and is variously stated in a series of decisions by this Court.
For example, in Scharf v. BMG Corporation:
"To mount a successful attack on the trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must
marshall all the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings."
3
In Cutler v. Bowman:
"In analyzing these opposing contentions we
tollow the traditional rule of viewing the evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be
drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the
findings made and the conclusions drawn by the
trial court."
and in Oberhansly v. Earle:
"We begin by noting that on appeal the
decision of the trial court is entitled to a
presumption of validity. We are required to view
the evidence and any inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to sustaining the decision. "
It is clear that the Court places the burden on the appellant from the trial court, the appellees here, to demonstrate
that reasonable minds could not agree with the findings by the
lower court as in Lawrence v. Bamberger
Railroad Co.,
"When the court has made findings and entered
judgment thereon as was done here, it is then our
duty to review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the findings, and they must be
allowed to stand if reasonable minds could agree
with them."
2.
3.
4V.
5.

Scharf v. BMG Corp, 700 P. 2d 1068, (Utah 1985).
Cutler v. Bowman, 543 P.2d 1349, (Utah 1975).
Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, (Utah 1977).
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 247,
282, P.2d 335, (1955).
-10-

and in R. C. Tolman Construction Co.,

Inc. v. Myton Water

Association,
"In analyzing the Plaintiff's contentions, it
is appropriate to have in mind these basic rules
of review on appeal: that we indulge the findings
and judgment o± the trial court with a presumption
of validity and correctness; review the record in
the light favorable to them; do not disturb them
if they find substantial support in the evidence;
and require plaintiff to sustain the burden of
showing error."
The Court of Appeals apparently relied upon Acton v.
7
Deliran,
a case where no findings of fact were prepared.
the

facts

are

contradictory,

confusing

and

Where

inconsistent, the

Court is justified in not making findings with respect to those
facts.

See R. C. Tolman Construction Co. Inc. v.

Myton Water Association where the Court refused to find the facts
as proposed by the Plaintiff.
The evidence before the trial judge on the issues of laches
and estoppel quoted by the Court of Appeals, was limited to the
testimony of Maud Kimball and Gary Kimball.

Under the standard

of review cited above, we should consider this evidence "in the
light most favorable to the trial judge".
Maud testified to personally hearing statements by Robert
Kimball in 1940 and in 1947.

6.
7.

In the 1940 statement Robert

R. C. Tolman Construction Co. Inc. v. Myton Water
Association, 563 P.2d 780, (Utah 1977).
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, (Utah 1987)
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allegedly said and Maud allegedly personally heard in response to
a request for tax reimbursement:
"I want to get out of Park City. I want to move
away and I want nothing further to do with
this".(trans, p. 126)
Maud's testimony at trial on the 1940 statement contradicts
her deposition testimony. In her deposition she testified that
the

first

statement

she

Exhibit

10 - Deposition

changed

her

transcript

initial
and

heard

about was

in

1947.

of Maud Kimball, p. 21)

testimony

testified

reported

that

the

at

page

reported

(Appendix
Later Maud

126

1940

of

the

statement

actually occurred in 1947. (Trans, p. 128)
The

conflict

created

by

Maud's

testimony

of

the

19 47

statement is that Robert Kimball was not in Park City that year
according to Elizabeth Kimball.

(Trans, p. 208)

All of Maud's testimony is contradicted by Gilbert at his
deposition and by her own spontaneous statement during Gilbert's
deposition. (Appendix Exhibit 7 - Deposition of Gilbert Kimball,
p. 52) .

Gilbert testified that he let the property go to tax

sale and purchased it from the county in his name on the advise
of a local judge.

There is no evidence of such a tax sale on

record. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.)
Gary described in a somewhat vague statement that he heard
Bob agree with Gilbert's management of the property

in 1953.

Gary does not tell us what Gilbert did or what Gilbert told
Robert.

(Trans, p. 156, L. 10-14)

Again, Elizabeth Kimball is

very sure her husband wasn't in Park City during 1953.

-12-

The evidence of statements to or from Robert were heavily
contradicted by the evidence that he was not in the State or that
such statements were not necessary.

The trial court found the

evidence to be unreliable that Pobert made any of the statements
supporting

laches

or

estoppel

after

personally

hearing

Kimball, Gary Kimball and Elizabeth Kimball testify.

Maud

The find-

ings of the trial court are reasonable under the circumstances,
based on substantial evidence in the record and are entitled to
the respect due a judge who has personally seen the witnesses,
the candor or lack of candor and weighed the credibility of the
witnesses.
The trial court here clearly and in detailed Findings of
Fact set forth the basis for its finding that no evidence was
present of any intent by Gilbert and Maud Kimball to exclude
Robert or of any adverse notice to Robert; that Gilbert and Maud
had not adversely possessed the property against their co-tenant
Robert W. Kimball and his successors in interest.

The Findings

of Fact of the trial court and the Conclusions of Law are entitled to the presumptions of validity defined in the cases cited
herein.

It is of some interest that the opinion by the Court of

Appeals does not challenge the Conclusions of Law or claim that
the court misapplied the law to the facts as it found them.

The

Court of Appeals simply disagreed with the facts as found and
chose to believe parties it had no opportunity to hear testify or
see before it.
standard

The Court of Appeals did not apply the proper

of review and

its decision

should

be

reversed and the trial judge's findings sustained.

-13-

corrected

and

POINT II
UNDER THE FACTS HERE, ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BAR A CO-TENANT
FROM DEFENDING AGAINST A CLAIM OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
After deciding that laches prevented the petitioners from
asserting the co-tenant interest of Robert Kimball, the Court of
Appeals

concluded

that the Fletchers were

also estopped

from

asserting Robert Kimball's co-tenant interest against the claim
of adverse possession.

The evidence

upon which

the estoppel

finding is based were the same disputed statements recited in
Point

I above

and

were

contradictory,

conflicting

and

found

unreliable by the trial court.
The statements attributed to Robert in the Court of Appeals
opinion are similar to the statements attributed to the co-tenant
o

which were found ineffective in Beckstrom v. Beckstrom,
the

party

claiming

adverse

possession

also

claimed

where

that

his

co-tenant was estopped from claiming his interest by statements
that "he wanted nothing further to do with the property

and that

he refused to pay taxes on it" (578 P.2d 520 at page 522).
Gilbert

Kimball

opportunity
refused.

to

claimed
pay

property

(Deposition

Exhibit 6)

that

of

he

taxes

Gilbert

gave
in

Robert

1947

Kimball,

and

page

Kimball
that

an

Robert

52, Appendix

Every statement attributed to Robert was contradicted

by testimony from Robert's widow Elizabeth that he was not in
Park City or the State of Utah during the years the claimed
statements were made.
8.

Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, (Utah 1978)
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The

allegations upon which

the estoppel claim was based were

immaterial, contradicted and were found to not be fact by the
trial court.
The Court of Appeals use of estoppel between co-tenants here
is contrary to the rule that in order for estoppel to exist there
must

be

detrimental

reliance

statements of the other.

by

one

party

upon

the

acts

or

There is no detrimental reliance by

Gilbert or Maud Kimball because they did nothing more than pay
taxes on the property which they had an obligation to do in the
absence

of

Robert's

controverted

statements.

The

claim

of

estoppel is also contradicted by the recitation in the 19 76 and
19 77 deeds
Kimball

from

Gilbert Kimball

to Gilbert

Kimball

and Maud

(Appendix Exhibits 5 and 6) that Gilbert was conveying

the interest he received with Robert Kimball in the 1940 deed
from Summit County.

Reliance by Gilbert and Maud Kimball on the

silence and inaction of Robert Kimball certainly could not give
rise to a claim of estoppel because Robert was not required to
come forward or take any action to protect his interest in the
absence of notice that Gilbert and Maud intended to adversely
9
possess against him. In Olwell v. Clark
this Court held that
mere length of time and exclusive possession alone is insufficient to find conduct creating a cause of action against a

9.

Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, (Utah 1982)

-15-

co-tenant and adverse possession.

The Court held that in Utah

the action of paying taxes and preserving title is presumed to be
for the benefit of all co-tenants and does not exclude other
co-tenants or give them a right of action.

The same is true

respecting possession and use of the property by one party or the
reputation one party may enjoy as sole owner of the property.
Established Utah law requires a relationship of confidence
and

trust

between

co-tenants

which

is

inconsistent

and

not

compatible with the claims of estoppel and laches found by the
Utah Court of Appeals.
to

recognize

the

Because the Utah Court of Appeals failed

fiduciary

standard

between

co-tenants

and

acknowledge this relationship in its discussion of the issues,
the Court of Appeals has applied the law in a manner that is in
conflict with many decisions of this Court.

POINT III
LACHES MAY NOT BE ASSERTED TO PREVENT A DEFENSE
AGAINST A CLAIM OF ADVERSE POSSESSION BY A CO-TENANT
The Utah Court of Appeals found that the petitioners were
barred

by

laches

from asserting

the co-tenant

interest orig-

inating with Robert W. Kimball against a claim of adverse possession.
The law in Utah is fairly well settled on the legal principles governing relations between co-tenants.
Clark

In Olwell v.

(Supra p. 15) the facts were similar to the facts here;
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one co-tenant paid all the taxes on the property and the original
grantee of the co-tenant
property in his estate.
line

of

Utah

cases

interest died without mentioning the
This Court in Olwell summarized a long

and

held

that

co-tenants

exist

in

a

relationship of confidence and trust, that the payment of taxes
by one inures to the benefit of both and that a co-tenant has no
notice or reason to believe that the payment of taxes by another
co-tenant
decision

is adverse
below

is

in any way.
in

direct

The Utah Court of Appeals

conflict

with

the

principles

described in Olwell v. Clark and in many other consistent Utah
cases.
Beginning with the early case of McCready v. Frederickson
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule that no co-tenant can
acquire

a

greater

interest

against

another

co-tenant

by

the

payment of taxes or purchase at a tax sale; a cause of action for
reimbursement

arises

according

to

their

respective

shares.

McCready held that because of the fiduciary relationship between
co-tenants, the payment of taxes is not an incident causing
grounds for action by one co-tenant against another.

In order

for laches to apply a party must know of some incident
gives rise to a cause of action.

which

In the case of the payment of

taxes by one co-tenant, a co-tenant who has not paid taxes has no

10.

McCready v. Frederickson, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316,
(1912)

-17-

cause of action against his co-tenant but has a duty of reimbursement.

Gilbert and Maud could have demanded reimbursement

and sued for repayment of Robert's share of the taxes but never
pursued any notice or claim against Robert. The Kimballs did not
improve the property and did not exclude Robert.
See:

Matthews v. Baker

affirming

the

principle

that ten-

ants-in-common stand in a fiduciary relationship to one another.
12
In Sperry V. Tolley
this Court again held that co-tenants
stand

in

a

fiduciary

relationship

to

one

another,

that

the

payment by one co-tenant of all taxes and the purchase by a
co-tenant for taxes did not constitute acts allowing the taxpaying co-tenant to acquire sole title to the property by adverse
possession.

The Court retained the rule adopted earlier that the

purchase of a tax title is insufficient to put co-tenants on
notice.

The Court of Appeals decision below is in conflict with

Sperry v. Tolley where the Court finds that redemption from a tax
sale is notice for purposes of laches.
In Peiselt v. Heiselt

13 this Court held that co-tenants

stand in a fiduciary relationship and hold title in trust for
each other.

This Court held that in the absence of the adversing

co-tenant informing the other co-tenant of its claim of exclusive

11.
12.
13.

Matthews v. Baker, 47 Utah 532, 155 P. 427, (1916)
Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2nd 542, (1948)
Heiselt v. Heiselt, 10 Utah 2d 126, 349 P.2d 175,
(1960)
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ownership, adverse possession could not be used
tenant

from

asserting

title.

This

Court

language that a tenant in common must

to bar a co-

used

the

familiar

"bring it home" to his

co-tenant and show by the most open and notorious acts that his
possession is intended to exclude in every way the rights of the
co-tenant.
It is appropriate

to reiterate

that

"acquiring

title by

adverse possession" means to rely on the statute of limitations
(78-12-7

U.C.A.)

property.

to

bar

another

from

proving

title

to

real

The adverse possession statute of limitations can only

begin to run against a co-tenant where notice "brings it home" to
a co-tenant that an ouster is underway.
and 1977 quit claim deeds

In this case, the 1976

(Appendix Exhibits 5 and 6) between

Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball

indicated

Gilbert

his

Kimball

is

Robert W. Kimball.

founded

upon

that the claim of

co-tenant

interest

with

The deed Language constitutes an admission

that Robert W. Kimball

or his

successors

in interest hold a

co-tenant interest in the property as of the dates of the deeds.
The

decision

of

the

Utah

Court

of Appeals

finding

that

laches may be used between fiduciaries where one party has not
been placed on notice of a recison for taking action is in conflict with the law and decisions of this Court in McCready v. Fredrickson,

Sperry v. Tolley,

Olwell v. Clark and others.

Heiselt v. Heiselt,

and

The fact that one co-tenant pays

taxes does not give rise to a cause of action by the non-paying
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co-tenant.

The

approval

of

the

Court

of Appeals

of

such a

procedure is in conflict with the prior decisions of this Court
with

respect

to

the

relationship

of

co-tenants

between

one

another in the question of payment of property taxes and effectively reverses all prior decisions for the appellants.

POINT IV
PERMISSION FROM A NON-OWNER OF REAL ESTATE WILL NOT DEFEAT
THE OPEN NOTORIOUS AND ADVERSE CHARACTER OF USE REQUIRED
TO ACQUIRE PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS
The trial court found that a portion of the subject property
lying between the warehouse parcel and the Coalition Building
parcel

had

Fletcher

been

used

for a period

and

occupied

by

the

in excess of twenty

notoriously and adversely to all parties.
Finding No. 10)

appellants

or Mel

(20) years openly,
(Appendix Exhibit 3

The finding is the result of a claim by the

appellants that as an alternative to the co-tenant interest of
Robert Kimball, the appellants hold prescriptive rights.
and

Peggy

Fletcher's

home

is

located

on

a

parcel

Melvin
of

immediately adjacent to and north of the Roy Fletcher home.

land
To

the rear of both parcels is the warehouse parcel purchased by
Gilbert and Robert Kimball in 1940.
A driveway

exists across the south end of the warehouse

parcel to the rear of the Roy Fletcher parcel.
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A separate driveway on the opposite end of the adjoining
parcels exists to the rear of the home owned by Melvin and Peggy
Fletcher.

The two Fletcher parcels

(Mel and Roy) are separate

and distinct adjoining lots.

During the course of the litigation

Gilbert

written

Kimball

obtained

statements

from

Melvin

Fletcher's brother and sister (Appendix Exhibits 8 and 9) stating
that Roy Fletcher had permission to use the driveway and the
adjacent land on the South end to the rear of the Roy Fletcher
parcel.

No testimony from third parties provided any evidence of

permission to use the north end of the warehouse parcel.
There was no evidence that prior to 1976 Gilbert Kimball or
Maud Kimball claimed the land described in Finding No. 10 by the
Court.

Only in 19 76 and in the later 19 77 correction deed did

Gilbert and Maud Kimball put anyone on notice by the recordation
of those deeds that they claimed any interest in the land over
which Mel Fletcher claims prescriptive rights.

Mr. Fletcher's

use of the area for more than 20 years prior to 1976 defined in
Finding No. 10 was clearly open, notorious and hostile to all
parties

hereby

creating

Zollinger v. Frank

a

prescriptive

, Jensen v. Brown

easement.

See:

, Crane v. Crane

. He

neither sought nor obtained permission from Gilbert Kimball to
use the parcel because Gilbert Kimball never claimed the parcel
prior to 1976.

14.
15.
16.

Melvin Fletcher purchased the land in 1954 and

Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514 175 P.2d 714, (1946).
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, (Utah 1981).
Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, (Utah 1984).
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used the driveway and rear yard portions of the property for
necessary

outbuildings,

garage

and

access

to

the

street

supporting the finding that he acquired a prescriptive easement.
See: Malouf v. Fischer

17

.

Prior to 1976, Gilbert Kimball did

not claim the area and a party v/ho is not an owner of real
property cannot give permission to use property to deteat the
claim of a prescriptive user who has used the property openly,
notoriously and adversely to all parties.
attempted
defined

to

defeat

the

in the pleadings

prescriptive
prior

Here, Gilbert Kimball

claim

of

the

Fletchers

of

Elizabeth

to the purchase

Kimball's co-tenant interest.
The appellants clearly demonstrated grounds for a prescriptive easement as an alternative to continue the use and occupancy
of the land described in Finding No. 10 by the trial court.

The

Utah Court of Appeals opinion contradicting the trial court is in
error finding that Gilbert Kimball's permission to Roy Fletcher
somehow

constituted

permissive

use

by Melvin

Fletcher

entirely separate and distinct parcel of property.

of

an

A separate

and distinct parcel was not claimed by Gilbert and Maud Kimball
until 1976 and therefore they could not have granted permission
to use the area to Melvin Fletcher or his predecessor.

The Court

should find that Melvin and Peggy Fletcher have established a

17.

Malouf v. Fischer, 159 P.2d 881, (Utah).

-22-

prescriptive right as defined by the trial court and that the
Fletchers are entitled to use their use and occupancy of the land
described in Finding No. 10 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Quiet Title on file below.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals deviated substantially from established Utah Law in its opinion reversing the decision of the
trial court.

The court below erred in misapplying the principles

established for the definition of co-tenant relationships in the
State of Utah, the standard of review in quiet title matters and
the

establishment

of

a

prescriptive

easement.

For

all

the

foregoing reasons, the court should reverse the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals and reinstate the findings of the trial
court or, in the alternative, require the trial court to make
specific

findings

with

respect

to

the

laches

and

estoppel

defenses proposed by the Utah Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,

GEPALD H. KINGHORN

-23-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the

day of July, 1989, I served

copies of the Appellants Brief on counsel for Gilbert and Maud
Kimball, Robert M. Felton and counsel for Sweeney Land Company,
Paul D. Veasy.

I further certify that on the

day of July,

1989, I notified counsel for the opposing parties of the date of
filing and the docket number of the case as provided by the clerk
of the court.
DATED this

day of July, 1989.

-24-

ADDENDUM

INDEX OF APPENDIX EXHIBITS

Page

EXHIBIT 1

6

EXHIBIT 2

4

EXHIBIT 3

20

EXHIBIT 4

5, 12

EXHIBIT 5

5, 15, 19

EXHIBIT 6

5, 14, 15, 19

EXHIBIT 7

5, 6, 12

EXHIBIT 8

21

EXHIBIT 9

21

EXHIBIT 10

12

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OCT - 5 1983

OoOoo
Sweeney Land Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Gilbert and Maud Kimball,
Defendants and Appellants,
Melvin and Peggy Fletcher,
Defendants and Respondents.
Case No. 880080-CA
Gilbert and Maud Kimball,
Crossclaim Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

FILED

v.
Melvin and Peggy Fletcher,
Counterclaira-crossclairaants
and Respondents.

Mc:.yf Kcoain
Cterk of the Cou*1
' Utch Coun of Appeals

Before Judges Davidson, Billings and Orme.

DAVIDSON, Judge:
This case involves conflicting claims to several small
parcels of real property located in Park City, Utah. In 1980,
the Sweeney Land Company (Sweeney) filed a complaint against
Gilbert1 and Maud Kimball (Kimballs) in addition to Melvin
and Peggy Fletcher (Fletchers) seeking to quiet title to
described land in Sweeney. The Fletchers counterclaimed and
alleged they had possessed the property "openly, notoriously,
and adversely for more than seven years and [they] have paid
the taxes on the same for more than seven years." The
Fletchers also claimed their use of the land gave them a
"prescriptive right or incorporeal hereditaments to said lands.'
1. Gilbert Kimball died during the course of litigation,
Kimballs were joint tenants in their property interests.

EXHIBIT 1

The

The Kimballs counterclaimed against Sweeney and crossclaimed
against the Fletchers alleging they were the owners of the
property as evidenced by a deed and, alternatively, by their
adverse possession.
The Fletchers subsequently discovered Gilbert Kimball's
deceased brother, Robert W. Kimball, allegedly held a cotenant
interest in the property. Melvin Fletcher obtained a quit-claim
deed from Robert1 s widow, Elizabeth, and then moved to amend the
pleadings to claim a cotenant interest with the Kimballs and to
request the property be partitioned. On February 22, 1984, the
Fletchers tendered to the clerk of the court one-half the taxes
on the property from 1942 to 1983 in view of their cotenant*s
interest. On August 1, 1984, Sweeney and the Fletchers filed a
stipulation in which the two parties agreed to exchange
quit-claim deeds concerning their respective interests in the
parcels.
Trial to the court was held on September 5 and 6, 1985. A
later hearing was held concerning objections to the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment and
decree of quiet title. Subsequently, the Kimballs and Sweeney
moved for further amendments or for a new trial but were
denied. We address only those issues .which are dispositive.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires that, "Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses." We are bound to follow the rule together with
the Utah Supreme Court's guidance, concerning the validity of
findings of fact, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987). This court will "accord conclusions of law no particular
deference, but review them for correctness." Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Fundamental to this opinion is our acceptance of the 1976
survey as the description of the property conveyed in the 1940
tax sale by Summit County to the brothers, Gilbert and Robert
Kimball. The survey was executed by a licensed land surveyor
who utilized the most accurate information then obtainable,
whereas the 1940 tax deed is described in general terms.
ROBERT W. KIMBALL INTEREST
The Fletchers1 claim is primarily based on the quit-claim
deed obtained from Robert W. Kimball's widow, Elizabeth. For
the quit-claim deed to have any validity, Robert must have been
a cotenant with Gilbert until his death and Elizabeth must have
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been Robert's successor in interest. There is no doubt that the
brothers purchased the property in 1940. Elizabeth testified
that Robert and she departed Park City in 1940 and never again
resided in that location. Although Elizabeth stated Robert had
not been in Utah during 1947 and 1953# she did testify that her
late husband did make some visits.
Maud Kimball testified that taxes on the property for the
years 1942 through 1947 were delinquent, but were redeemed by
Gilbert Kimball who then made payment on the taxes until his
death in 1983. She stated that neither Robert nor his estate
made any contribution for property taxes. Maud further
testified that she was present in 1940 or 1941 when Gilbert and
Robert had a discussion relative to the property at issue. When
Gilbert asked Robert "if he wanted to pay half of the tax,"
Robert is reported as saying, "Hell no, I want to get out of
Park City. I want to move away, and I want nothing further to
do with this." Maud also stated that the brothers discussed the
property in 1947. Maud testified, "My husband Gilbert asked if
[Robert] wanted to redeem himself and be put back for half of
the taxes, and he said, no, I'm living in California now, and I
still want nothing to do with it." When questioned about
answers given in her deposition taken prior to trial, Maud
attempted to clear up what appeared tq be discrepancies
concerning whether she heard the conversations between Gilbert
and Robert. She also stated that Robert told the Kimballs to
remove his name from the deed, but because he was on vacation,
Robert would not go to the county seat and clarify the matter
with a quit-claim deed.
Gary Kimball, a son of Gilbert and Maud Kimball, testified
that, in about 1953, he was present when his father and his
Uncle Robert discussed property in Park City. A portion of the
conversation concerned the property at issue. When his father
told Robert what he had done relative to redeeming the property,
Gary stated, "[Robert] said it was fine with him. He was out of
Park City. He was gone for good and had no more interests here."
Gilbert
his death.
said he had
any part of
taxes. And

Kimball's deposition was taken a few months prior to
In it he stated, "Long before my brother died he
nothing to do with this property. He refused to pay
the taxes on it, so we let the property go to
we bought it back in my name [in 1947],"

Attached to the notice of probate distribution recorded by
the Fletchers* counsel was the decree of distribution concerning
Robert's estate. Although the residuary clause refers to "any
and all other property which may belong to said Estate, whether
herein particularly mentioned or not," the section dealing with
real property only refers to Robert's home in Salt Lake City.
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The court found no evidence that the Kiraballs ever gave
notice to Robert of their intent to adversely possess the
property. The court further found that Robert had never
officially conveyed his interest to the Kimballs. However, the
court made no findings concerning the extensive evidence showing
Robert's intent that the Kimballs have the property. No
evidence was present-*'* *n rebuttal.
The Kimballs assert that the claims of both the Fletchers
and Sweeney are barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel.
a. Egches
This doctrine was recently discussed in Borland Bv Dent, of
Social Serv. v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987), where
the court stated, "To successfully assert a laches defense, a
defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably
delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was
prejudiced by that delay.- In Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v.
Suoarhouse Shopping Center Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975),
the court wrote:
Although lapse of time is an essential
part of laches, the length of time must
depend on the circumstanced of each case,
for the propriety of refusing a claim is
equally predicated upon the gravity of the
prejudice suffered by defendant and the
length of plaintiffs delay.
Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted^.
If we assume Gilbert's redemption of the property in his
name in 1947 and notification of such redemption to Robert no
later than the mid-1950fs as giving rise to a cause of action
by Robert or his successors in interest, approximately 25 years
passed before any complaint was filed. During this period, the
Kimballs paid all the property taxes and conducted themselves
as if they had sole ownership. If Robert believed he still
possessed a cotenant interest, his failure to claim the
interest from the Kimballs or to commence an action prior to
his death must be considered unreasonable and prejudicial to
the Kimballs. This claim is barred by laches.
b. EstQPPQl
Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980), reports,
-The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his
acts, representations, or conduct, or by his silence when he
ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts exist
and such other relies thereon to his detriment (footnote
omitted).- Additionally, -The elements of equitable estoppel
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are: 'conduct by one party which leads another party/ in reliance
thereon# to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his
conduct.** Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688/
691 (Utah 1985)(quoting United American Life Ins. Co. v. zigng
First Nat'l Bank. 641 P.2d 158/ 161 (Utah 1985)).
The Kimballs have relied on Robert's renouncement of interest
in the property and on his continued silence and inaction to the
time of his death. Robert's successors in interest now repudiate
his actions and claim that he continued to maintain his status as
a cotenant. There is little doubt that such repudiation is
detrimental to the Kimballs. Because Gilbert and Maud believed
Robert no longer desired an interest in the property/ they did
not pursue the matter further. If they had been given an
indication of a change in Robert's position prior to his death/
they could have attempted to obtain a conveyance from Robert/
obtained an affidavit/ or possibly brought a quiet title action.
Robert's death rendered any further negotiations or contact with
him impossible. Due to their reliance/ the Kimballs found
themselves in court defending title to the property. Even had we
not found laches to bar this claim, it would be barred by
estoppel. The Fletchers cannot claim any interest in the
property because of the quit-claim deed from Robert's widow,
Elizabeth.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
The court found that the Fletchers' use of a portion of the
property was adverse to the Kimballs. Specifically/ the trial
court found the Fletchers' use "was not under any agreement or
permission from any person or entity." We disagree. To hold a
finding of fact to be clearly erroneous requires "that if the
findings . . . are against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings . . . will
be set aside." State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315/ 317 (Utah App.
1987)(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191/ 193 (Utah 1987)).
In Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982)/ the court wrote:
[I]n order to show successful adverse
possession/ the claimant must intend to
acquire title# must by declaration or
conduct give actual or constructive notice
to the legal title holder, and must possess
the property in a manner variously called
"open," "notorious/" or "hostile" for a
period of seven years. . . .
It is
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generally agreed that, in order for the
claimants conduct to give notice, it must
be conduct that is inconsistent with the
rights of the owner.
Id* at 587 (citation omitted).
Adverse possession cannot arise from use by the claimant
with the permission of the legal title holder. Hammond v.
Johnson. 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). The record contains
overwhelming evidence which indicates the Fletchers had
permission to use portions of the property. Gilbert, in his
deposition, states that Melvin Fletcher1s father, Roy, had
asked him for permission "to use the ground." The permission
was granted as long as the Kimballs "had no use for it."
Gilbert further claimed that Roy believed he owed Gilbert rent
which the latter refused to accept. The deposition asserts
that Gilbert offered to sell Melvin the property, but the two
never agreed on a price. Gilbert's deposition refers to an
exhibit which is a statement written by Juanita Fletcher Love,
Roy's daughter and Melvin's sister. The statement reflects
Juanita *s understanding that a portion of the property in
dispute belonged to Gilbert and was used with his permission.
Additional mention is made of another exhibit which was also
received by the trial court, a statement by Marion Fletcher,
Roy's son and Melvin's brother. This statement indicates that
Roy's use of the Kimball property was subject to Gilbert's
revocable permission. Maud testified that the Fletcher family
always had permission to use a portion of the Kimball
property. Gary Kimball testified he was present when his
father, Gilbert, discussed the property with Melvin and the
latter made an offer of approximately $90,000 - $96,000 for
it. Also, Melvin Fletcher testified, when asked if his family
had the permission of the Kimball family to go across the
property, "In a sense, yes, if they [the Kimballs] owned the
ground." Melvin*s testimony reveals he offered Gilbert $60,000
for the property, but had been refused. This evidence shows
that Melvin's use of the Kimball property was with consent.
We, therefore, hold that the finding of adverse possession, or
conduct inconsistent with the rights of the Kimballs, is
against the clear weight of the evidence.
The Fletchers have acquired no interest in the Kimball
Property at issue either through the quit-claim deed from
Elizabeth or under the doctrine of adverse possession. The
case is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment
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consistent with this opinion.2 Any Sweeney claims that are
based on deeds received from the Fletchers and concern the
Kimball property# must fail. Title to that property is quieted
in the Kimballs. There appears to be no reason why the deeds
between Sweeney and the Fletchers, not affecting the Kimball
property, should not stand, although the trial court should
examine this on remand. Each party will bear their own costs
on appeal.
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything significant
to existing law. Additionally, the fact situation is so
complex that the case might prove confusing to any reader. For
these reasons this opinion is not to be published in the Utah
or Batrrfic Reporters. ^

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge'

ORME, Judge:

(concurring specially)

I agree that this difficult case should be remanded,
although I am not prepared to go as far as my colleagues in
defining what the outcome on remand should be.

2. We find it difficult to follow from the record why the trial
court signed the judgment and decree of quiet title which does
not comport with its oral ruling. We realize the trial court
heard objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the judgment and decree, but there is nothing before us to
indicate why the changes from the oral ruling were made.
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As concerns the issue of Robert Kimballfs widow1s curious
conveyance to Melvin Fletcher, I also see error in the trial
court's not making findings "concerning the extensive evidence
showing Robert's intent that the Kiraballs have the property,*
While the majority's analysis of the two doctrines is sound, I
am not# however, persuaded that the evidence shows as a matter
of law that the Fletchers' claim is barred by laches and/or
estoppel.
As to this part of the dispute, I would simply
remand with instructions that the trial court make findings
relative to Robert's comments and conduct and draw any
appropriate legal conclusions concerning laches and estoppel
from those findings.
I concur in Judge Davidson's opinion insofar as it concerns
the adverse possession issue and the treatment to be accorded on
remand to the deeds between Sweeney and the Fletchers.
I share Judge Davidson's puzzlement as reflected in
footnote 2 of the main opinion. While it is true that *[a]ny
judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case
until a decision is formally rendered," Bennion v. Hansen, 699
P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985), the court's ruling from the bench,
fresh on the heels of trial, is a product of the court's own
mental impressions and contemporaneous, neutral assessment of
the evidence. Subsequently presented* findings of fact and
conclusions of law, insofar as different from such a ruling, are
more a product of counsel's view of the case—and sometimes of
his or her imagination. While a court has every right to alter
its perception of a case, it should take pains to explain fully
any differences between its "untainted" ruling from the bench
and its formal decree.
Finally, I would order counsel not to disclose this case to
the Bar Examiner: Committee of the Utah State Bar. They would be
unable to resist fashioning the next Bar exam's real property
question after the facts of this case—and such would clearly
violate the Bar applicants' rights under the eighth amendment to
the United States Constitution.

„ f£
G r e g o r y i C . Or me, Judge
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fails to dedeed as corscribe paircel.
rected by 1976 No adverse
correction deed, possession.
succession
from Robert
Kimball and
Quitclaim Deed
from Elizabeth
Kimball.

[Same as p a r c e l

Same as parcel
1.

Same as parcel No claim.

100$ vested in [Same as parcel
Maud Kimball by 1.
19^0 tax deed
as corrected by
1976 correction
deed and operation of law at
death of joint
tenant G.
Kimball.

None. PartiNo claim,
tion by Court.

Sweeney
Land 'Co,

(

Kimball

i

r^^>
!'
1 i

/

21

1,

f

4

1

5

I
I

'

100$ pursuant to tax deed as
corrected by 1976 correction
deed, joint tenancy to Maud
Kimball.

1

50$ co-tenant
interest.

j 50$ co-tenant
' interest. (Tax
deed as corrected by 1976
correction
deed and operation of law at
death of joint
tenant G.
Kimball. No adverse possession. )

100$
pursuant
to partition by
court.

1.

Fletcher
I
50$ co-tenancy pursuant to tax
deed, as corrected by 1976
correction deedi heirship to
Elizabeth Kimball Quitclaimed
to Fletchers.

100$ pursuant to
partition by court.

Sweeney

1
100$ pursuant to United Park
City Mines Co. Quitclaim Deed,

LEGEND:

PARCEL
PARCEL
PARCEL
PARCEL
PARCEL

1
2
3
4
5

—
—
—
—
—

the
the
the
the
"the

3.

50$ co-tenant interest
pursuant to Quitclaim
Deed from Fletchers.

"Herschiser Parcel".
north half of the 30 foot strip.
south half of the 30 foot strip.
north half of the warehouse parcel.
south half of the warehouse parcel.

50$ co-tenant
interest conveyance from
Fletcher.

3.

No party appeared to represent interest of Herschiser1s to
parcels 1,2, and 3. Default entered after service by publication.
EXHIBIT 2
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GERALD H, KINGHORN
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8644
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY,

NO
J?'J £ *F f)

NOV 5 7SC5

!

Plaintiff,

Clem M

!

JU

BY

vs.

Depur Cart

a

r

•**"*"

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL
et al.,
Defendants.
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL,
i

Civil No. 6211

Crossclaim Plaintiffs,
vs.
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY
FLETCHER, et al.,
Counter-Crcssclainants.
On the 5th day of September, 1985, at 9:00 a.m. the issues
raised in the pleadings between the parties came on regularly for
non-jury trial before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge,
at the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah.
The

Plaintiff

was

present

and

represented

by counsel,

Edward S. Sweeney and Paul D. Veasy of Behle, Has lam and Hatch,
the defendant, counterclaimant and crossclaimant Maud Kimball was
present in person and by counsel, Robert M. Felton. Defendants,
counterclaimants and crossclaimantS, Kelvin and Peggy Fletcher

EXHIBIT 3

33i:

were present in person and were represented by Gerald H. Kinghorn
of Kapaloski, Kinghorn & Peters.
Mr. Felton moved the Court for an order excluding witnesses
from

the

Courtroom

until called

to testify.

The motion was

granted and the Court asked that each witness proposed by the
parties, except the parties themselves, be sworn.

The Court then

admonished the witnesses to not discuss their testimony or the
testimony of others except with counsel.

The proposed witnesses

were then excluded from the Courtroom.
Counsel for each party made a short opening statement. After
the conclusion of the opening statements of counsel, Mr. Felton
moved the Court for an order granting a judgment of quiet title
to Maud Kimball for a portion of the property at issue generally
described as the "Hershiser" parcel.

After hearing the arguments

of counsel, the Court denied the motion with leave to reconsider
after hearing the evidence.
The parties presented a written stipulation to the Court
signed

by

counsel

for each party to permit the

admission as

evidence of the exhibits named in the stipulation, reserving the
claims of the parties as to the relevance and/or materiality of
the exhibits.
ences

between

exhibits were
where

The stipulation is the result of pretrial confercounsel

for

the

parties

where

disclosed, reviewed, investigated

the
and

stipulated
corrected

appropriate, to enable the parties to stipulate

to the

admission of the exhibits without the necessity of

individual

witness

It

or document

foundation

-2-

for each

exhibit.

is the

OOO

understanding of the parties on the record that the plaintiffs
exhibits 1, 2,
•ci:!^.

3 and 5 are admitted. -£es—illustrative purpeaea*

The Court approved the stipulation of the parties and

received the exhibits in evidence.
The Plaintiff called and examined the following witnesses:
Randy Sorensen, Robert B. Jones,

Kelvin H. Fletcher and Edward

S. Sweeney.
The Defendant Kimball then called and examined the following
witnesses:

Maud Kimball, Gary Kimball, Robert Ruggeri, Melvin

Fletcher; the deposition of Gilbert Kimball was considered as
evidence of the testimony of Gilbert Kimball.

The depositions of

Maud Kimball and Melvin Fletcher were published.
The Defendants Fletcher then called and examined the following witnesses:

Les Roach and Elizabeth W. Kimball.

Following the testimony of the witnesses en behalf of the
Defendants Fletcher, Defendant Kimball recalled Maud Kimball as a
rebuttal witness.
Each
counsel

party

for

each

rested

and

a closing

of the parties.

statement

At

the

was

conclusion

made

by

of the

closing statements of counsel, the Court recessed the trial at
5:30

p.m. on September 5 th to be reconvened

September 6, 19 85 for further proceedings.
9:00

a.m.

trial

was

reconvened

and

the

at 9:00

a.m. on

On September 6 at
Court

announced

its

decision in general terms and directed counsel for the Defendants
Fletcher to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
Decree of Quiet Title based on the evidence.
OQ-1

Based

upon

the

testimony

in open

Court,

the

documents,

surveys and affidavits entered into evidence, the candor and lack
of candor, demeanor of the witnesses and parties and the equities
in favor of or against each party apparent from the facts and
circumstances established by the evidence, the Court makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The real property which is the subject of the claims of

the parties is located in Elock 53 of Snyders Addition to Park
City as recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Summit
County, Utah.
2.

Block 53 of Snyders Addition to Park City as shown by

the records of the Summit County Recorder was platted as a block
of land without platting cr dedication of interior streets or
further subdivision into lots.
3.

The Plaintiff and the Defendants Fletcher signed and

filed a stipulation dated May 31, 19S4.

Sweeney Land Company and

Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher have performed the execution
and delivery of the deeds described in the stipulation,
4.

Based

on

the

pleadings

herein,

the

parties

claim

unencumbered fee simple title to certain parcels of land generally described as follows:
Sweeney Land Co* claims title to a parcel of land approximately 30 feet in width extending from the east street line of
Park Avenue in Park City as the westerly boundary, thence in a
northeasterly direction thirty feet wide for approximately 164

-4-

3S5

feet (the 30 foot strip) .

Sweeney Land Company has quitclaimed

15 feet of the 30 foot strip south cf the center line of the 30
foot strip to the Defendants Fletcher for a distance extending
from East line of Park Avenue northeasterly for approximately 99
feet.

The Fletchers have quitclaimed the north 15 feet of the 30

foot strip to Sweeney Land Co. and all the Fletchers interest in
the

"Hershiser"

parcel.

Sweeney Land

Co. did

not

amend

its

pleadings thereafter,
Maud Kimball claims a large parcel of land including the
warehouse area, the 30 foot strip and the Hershiser parcel as
described more specifically in the Defendant Kimball counterclaim
and crossclaim.

The Kimball claim overlaps the east 65 feet of

the Sweeney 30 ft. strip claim.

The Hershiser parcel is the

northern-most portion of the land claimed but does net conflict
with the Plaintiff claim. (The "Hershiser-Kimball Parcel").
The Fletchers claim a 50% undivided interest as co-tenants
with Maud Kimball to the "Hershiser-Kimball" parcel, the South 15
feet of the 30 foot strip deeded to them by Sweeney Land Company
and as an alternative claim, a prescriptive easement for continued use as garage, storage space, parking and
egress

over, across

and

through the

ingress and

Hershiser-Kimball

adjacent to the east of the Fletchers home parcel.

parcel

The ownership

of the heme area deeded to the Fletchers by Mary Workman is not
at issue.
The

present

counter-claim

and

Fletcher

claims

cross-claim

are

filed

-5-

defined
by

in

Fletchers

the

amended

after

they

1 n ~

oOO

received a deed from Elizabeth W. Kimball in 1983, which described the same land as claimed by Maud Kimball.
5.

For at least one hundred years prior to the filing of

the complaint herein, properties were generally conveyed in the
area of

the

subject

properties

without

accurate

surveyed

or

dimension specific legal descriptions and under general statements as to the location and dimensions of the subject properties.

Under the circumstances, it is reasonable that the Court

interpret the legal descriptions contained in the various instruments upon which the parties claims are based in a manner consistent with

the physical

location of buildings

and objects in

relation to each other, roads, improvements, dimensions described
in the instruments and the actual possession of the properties by
the parties and their predecessors in interest.
7.

The 30 foot strip claimed by the Plaintiff Sweeney was

conveyed to the Sweeney's predecessor, the United Park City Mines
Co., in 1953 by the Silver King Coalition Mines Company and Park
Utah Consolidated Mines Ccmpany by a deed which described the
property as a 30 foot strip of land which began at the easterly
side of Park Avenue and extended in a northerly direction for an
indefinite distance to a point generally stated as a right-of-way
granted

under

a

specific deed dated November

13, 1883.

The

November 13, 1883 deed described in the conveyance to United Park
City Mines Co. is not of record and there is no evidence cf the
terms or specific location of the right of way described in the
missing deed.

In 1953 when the deed to United Park Mines was

executed and delivered, the scalehouse and warehouse described in
the legal description of the 30 foot strip were not in existence
and therefore the northeasterly boundary of the 30 foot strip
could not be identified.
8.

In 1940 Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball purchased

from Summit County certain interests in land in the area of the
Hershiser-Kimball parcel.

The area had been purchased in 1928 by

Robert W. Kimball, the father of Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert
Kimball.

Robert W. Kimball conveyed the property to Robert T.

Kimball.

Robert and Gilbert thereafter deeded the property in a

mortgage-deed transaction as security f<?r a loan.

Taxes on the

property were not paid and the property ultimately was purchased
by

Summit County

Gilbert

Kimball

for taxes.
purchased

In 194 0 Robert

the

T. Kimball and

Eershiser-Kimball

parcel

from

Summit County under a general legal description which did not
completely and accurately describe the dimensions of the area
Summit County intended to convey and the Kimballs intended to
purchase.
Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball were brothers and
business partners in the Kimball service station and garage.

In

1976, the Defendant Kimball commissioned a survey by Robert Jones
of the property owned pursuant to the deed from Summit County
executed and delivered in 1940 to Gilbert Kimball and Robert T.
Kimball.

The 1976 Jones survey accurately depicts the property

intended to be conveyed to the Kimball brothers in 1940 by Summit
County.

-7-
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9.

The plaintiff received a quitclaim

Park City Mines
partially

in

overlaps

1980 containing
the

property

a

land

claimed

deed

from United

description
by

the

which

Defendants

Fletcher and Kimball; the Plaintiffs were on notice by virtue of
the recordation

of the deed by the Defendant Kimball

of the

cverlap and the actual occupation and historic use of the area by
Fletcher that

title to the 30 foot strip was disputed.

The

Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest used and occupied no
more than the north 15 feet of the 30 foot strip, for a distance
of 99 feet extending from the easterly right of way line of Park
Avenue.
10.
and

Portions of the property claimed by Sweeney Land Co.

Kimball

have

been

used

and

occupied

by

the

Defendants

Fletcher for a period in excess of 20 years openly and notoriously.

The use of the Hershiser-Kimball property by the Defendants

Fletcher and the Fletchers predecessor in interest was not under
any agreement or permission from any person or entity.

There is

no credible evidence that the Fletchers use was not adverse to
Kimballs and all others and therefore the use by Fletchers was
and

is adverse

to the Kimballs.

The area used

and

occupied

openly, notoriously, adversely, and exclusively by the Defendants
Fletcher is generally described as that area lying North of a
line beginning at the Southeast corner of the land conveyed to
Melvin H. Fletcher by his predecessor in interest and proceeding
therefrom at a bearing of North 61° 10f East across the Kimball
property to the gravel road depicted on the exhibits a distance

-8-
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of approximately 71 ft. with the exception of a small stucco
building

located on the property which has

Defendant Kimball since approximately 1940.

been used by the
No portion of the

property described by the Kimball counterclaim has been occupied
by the Kimballs with the exception of the stucco building indicated on the Exhibits within the last forty years.
The Defendants Fletcher occupied the area of the 30 foot
strip claimed by the Defendants Kimball for a period in excess of
20 years and used the area for commercially valuable purposes
including ingress and egress to their property, for parking of
vehicles, for garage purposes and foy the storage of household
materials, garden utensils, hunting equipment and other miscellaneous, personal property.
11.

The Plaintiff and its predecessors

in

interest paid

property taxes for an area which was indefinite and therefore the
Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof that the
Plaintiff paid property taxes on the entire 30 foot strip as
claimed in the complaint.

The payment of property taxes by the

Plaintiff was consistent with the claims of the other parties and
the legal description in the deed to United Park City Mines in
1953.
12.

The

Kimballs

paid property

taxes

from

1977

to the

present on the entire parcel described in the survey of property
by Robert B. Jones.
13.

Based on the testimony of Maud Kimball and the rele-

vant deed language Gilbert J. Kimball and Maud Kimball intended

9

0.7U

to create a joint tenancy interest between themselves by the
execution and recordation of the deeds.
prior

Gilbert Kimball died

to the trial of the matter and his

joint

tenant Maud

Kimball survived him.
14.

There

is no evidence that Gilbert

J.

Kimball, Maud

Kimball or any party on their behalf ever provided notice of any
kind to Robert W. Kimball or his successors to the effect that
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball intended to adversely possess
the Kimball parcel as against Robert W. Kimball; there is no
instrument or other evidence of the conveyance of the co-tenant
interest of Robert W. Kimball to Gilbert Kimball or Maud Kimball
or conveyance of the interest of Robert W. Kimball to any party
other

than

by

operation

Wilkins Kimball.

of

In 1976,

law

to Robert's

(the date of

heir,

death

of

Elizabeth
Robert W.

Kimball) Robert Kimball had not received notice of any act of
adverse

possession

Kimball

parcel;

interest

in

or executed

Robert

the

any

Kimball

instrument

possessed

Hershiser-Kimbail

parcel

an
as

to

convey

the

undivided

50%

more

correctly

described in the Robert B. Jones survey which is of record.
15.

Since 1942 Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball have paid

the property taxes on the Hershiser-Kimbail parcel including the
taxes due November 30, 1983 in the total amount of $4,641.66.
The

record

shows

that

en

or

about

February

15,

1984, the

Fletchers tendered the sum of $2,320.83 to the Defendant Kimball
by check to the Clerk of the Court where the funds tendered are
on

deposit.

The

Defendants

Fletcher

-10-

are

indebted

to

the

<3JX

Defendant Kimball for one half of the amount of all property
taxes paid by the Defendant Kimball which 'is the sum of $2,320.83
not including taxes for the years 1984 and 1985.

The Defendants

Fletcher owe an amount equal to one half of the property taxes
for 1984 and 1985 to Maud Kimball.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the Court makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The claim of each party must be sustainable on its own

merits.

Each claim should be evaluated based on a root of title

or title by adverse possession where appropriate*
the

stipulation

are reasonable and the

The terms of

stipulation

should be

approved and recognized by the Court and where otherwise appropriate made a part of the Decree of Quiet Title herein.
2.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of quiet title as

its sole property to a strip of land north of the centerline of
the 30 foot strip for a distance of 99.03 feet from the east
right-of-way line of Park Avenue
Snyders Addition to Park City.
a decree quieting

as

platted

in

the

plat

of

The Plaintiff may be entitled to

title in the Plaintiff

to a 50% undivided

interest with Kaud Kimball in the Hershiser parcel deeded to the
Plaintiff by Defendants Fletcher together with a 50% undivided
interest in the 15 feet North of the centerline of the 30 foot
strip

deeded

to

the

Plaintiff

by

the

Defendants

Fletcher*

Because the pleadings of the Plaintiffs do not state a claim for
quiet title as a co-tenant with Maud Kimball or for partition of

-11-

39*

the co-tenant interests the decree herein should not define an
interest other -than the interest of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder,
3.

The Defendants Kelvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher are

the successors-in-interest to the co-tenant interest of Robert W.
Kimball as conveyed to them by his heir Elizabeth W. Kimball.

It

is reasonable that the interests of the co-tenants be partitioned
in a manner consistent with the reasonable use of the property by
each co-tenant and in a manner which will preserve the economic
value for each party in a roughly equal manner.
quiet

title

should

partition

The decree of

the Eershiser-Kimball

parcel

to

quiet title in Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher to the portion
of the Eershiser-Kimball parcel described as follows:
Beginning at a point North 23°38f West
85.97 feet and North 33°26f West 46.70 feet
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, Amended
plat of Park City in Section 16 Township 2
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and South 61°10f West, 73.16 feet
and North 28° 50" West 55.7 feet to the true
point of beginning;
Thence along the following courses and
distances: North 28°50f West along the East
boundary of the land conveyed to Melvin
Fletcher by Mary Workman a distance of 60.6
feet, thence North 61°10f East 61.93 feet,
thence South 43° 13f East 15 feet, thence
South 33°25f East 47.6 feet more or less,
thence South 61 o 10' West 70 feet mere or less
to the true point of beginning.
4.
of

the

The area of the Hershiser-Kimball parcel which is South
Fletcher

partition

parcel

described

above

should

be

partitioned to Maud Kimball as her sole and separate property.

333

Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball were joint tenants in the 50%
undivided

interest purchased by Gilbert in 1940 and therefore

upon Gilbert's death any interest of Gilbert terminated and Maud
became

the

sole

owner of the 50% undivided

Hershiser-Kimball parcel.

interest

in the

A decree of quiet title should issue

to Maud Kimball as follows:
Beginning at a point North 23° 38' West
85.97 feet and North 33° 26' West 46.7 feet
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, amended
plat of Park City, Utah in Section 16,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 61° 10' West
73.16 feet, thence North 28° 50' West 55.7
feet, thence North 61° 10' East, 70 feet more
or less, thence South 33° 25f' East, 58 feet
more or less to the point of beginning.
Maud Kimball should also be decreed a 50% undivided interest
as a co-tenant with Sweeney Land Company as the owner of a 50%
undivided interest in the Hershiser parcel as described in the
exhibits and to the balance of the land north of the extended
center line of the 30 foot strip immediately adjacent to the
parcel of

land quieted to Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher

above.
5.

It is reasonable that each party bear its own attorneys

fees and costs and therefore no award of attorneys fees or costs
should be made to any party against the other.
DATED t h i s

_J$r&Y

of

nr»"'hfir,

1985.

BY THEATCUFT
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Moi-o-i'n F
F ll ee tt cc n
h ee rr Dy
bv Mary
e of
c o n v e y e- dj t*«
o Melvin
* Workman a t dh iesntcaen cSouth
E st
bl
6 0 . 6 f e e t , t h e n c e North 61 10
* . . . : ; r 9 c 7 -.' t 4 7 6 f e e t
47« 1 3 ' E a s t 15 f e e t , t h e n c e South 33 25
East 4 / . b t e e t
more o r l e s s , Whence South 6 1 - 1 0 ' West 70 f e e t more o r l e s s
t o t h e t r u e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g .
Each p a r t y i s t o bear t h e i r own c o s t s and a t t o r n e y s
DATED t h i s

_ ^ d'day

JSL

of-Ce^efetjr4; 1 9 8 5 .
BY THE cAjRT:

3KV SAGE 3 0 0

-3-

fees.

Western States Title Company
P.O. Box 714, Part, City, Utah 84060
Telephone 301^49-^777
Page No-

SUMMIT COUNTY, A
municipal corporation
of t h e ' S t a t e of Utah
-toGIL3ERT J . KIMBALL and
R03ERT W. KIMBALL,

91

QUIT CLAIM DEED
Entry Ho. 66568
Recorded March 22, 194.0
Sock G, Page 224.
Dated March 2 2 , 1940
Cons: $43.00 and $2.00 for
the deed

CCNVSY & QUIT CLAIMS:
All i t s r i g h t , t i - l e and I n t e r e s t a c q u i r e d under t a x s a l e
for the years 1932-3-5-7-?, the following d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y i n
Summit County, Utah, t c - v i t :
98 f e e t by 77 feet en Block 53 of Snyder T s Addition to Park
C i t y , Utah.
The above property vas sold for d e l i n q u e n t t a x e s for t h e
y e a r s 1 9 3 2 , 3 , 5 , 7 and 1933 inclusive in the name of Sydney Mulcock
and an a u d i t o r s deed taken by Summit County.
This deed i s made under a u t h o r i t y of S e c t i o n 80-10-68
Revised S t a t e s of Utah, 1933 and pursuant t o en o r d e r of the Board
of County Commissioners, dulv passed on the 4 t h day of March,
1930.
Witness:
iigned:
SUMMIT COUNTY,
Chas L. F r o s t
corporation of
SEAL
(
)
3y:
John E. Wright
Ack ! d March 22, 1940, regularly before Kae R. T r e e ,
(Seal)
(SHOWN FOR INFORMATION)

EXHIBIT 4
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t h e S t a t e o f Utah y
Clerk
County Recorder,
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED
GXLBIJtT J . KIMBALL AMD MAUD KIMBALL, BIS WIPE,
grantor*
• £ * • £ * City,
. Canary ef
Bmit ,
t Stmt* o< Utah, kr«by
QUIT-CLAIM
m
GXLBZXT J . KIMBALL AMD MAQO KIMBALL, B2I WXPK, AS JOINT TENANTS WITH
FULL BIGBTS QT BUPVJVQBSHXP,
**
Park C i t y , Cooaty of BtaaUt, S t a t e of Utah
W
*
Bad o t h e r food Bad v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,
tfctfcl.ni.gl
1 loaac aikadni
txmmLt

for d» »un oc*
* * * DOLLARS.
Coenty.

B e g i n n i n g a t B p o i n t Horth 23* 38* Wast S 3 . 9 7 f e a t f r o * t h e
B o e t h e a a t c o r w r o f Block 7, Aaended P l a t o f Park C i t y i n S e c t i o n 1 6 ,
T o w u M p 2 S o u t h , Banga 4 Xaat, B a i t LaJtc Base and Meridian and
raaioa
thonoe Booth 41* 1 0 ' M a t 7 3 . 1 4 f e e t ; t h e n c e North 28* !
1 2 8 . 5 9 f e e t ; thanca Worth 41* 1 0 9 Eaat 3 3 . 9 0 f w t ; t h e n c * North
2 f SO* ttast 3 0 . 0 0 f a a t i thaaoa North * 4 * l l 9 Baat 1 7 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e
• o v t h 4 3 # 1 3 9 Baat 3 4 . 5 0 f e e t ; thanca Bouth 33* 2 5 * Eaat 1 0 3 . 3 0 f e a t
t o t h e p o i n t o f beginning and b e i n g tha ***** p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d i n
tfcat c e r t a i n Quit-Claim Deed f r o * Boacdt County, g r a n t o r , t o G i l b e r t
J . El • h a l l and Bobert V. Kimball, g r a n t o r s , r a c o r d a d i n t h e r e c o r d s
o f t h e Beamit County Beoorder on March 2 2 , 1940 i n Book G of Q u i t - d a i a
D e e d e , p . 2 2 4 , n s Entry Ho. 44541 and daacribed t h e r e i n aa 98 f e e t by
77 f e e t on Block 5 3 , Bayders Addition and b e a r i n g S e r i a l No. RA-34 8 .
IWhy hie. . ^ J £ « 5 T
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Western States Title Company
P.O. Box 714, Park, Cify, Utah 84060
Telephone 801-649-8777
Page No,

1C2

CORRECTED QUIT CLAIM DEED

GILBERT J. KIMBALL and
MAUD KIMBALL, his wife,

Entry No. H0155
Recorded Sept. 7, 1977
Book K-99, Page 504
Dated Sept._, 1977
Cons:$10.CO and other gccd
and valuable consideration.

-toGIL3ZRT J, KIMBALL AND
MAUD KIMBALL, lis wife,
as joint tenants with full
rights of survivorship,

QUIT CLAIM:
Beginning at a point North 23 degrees 33 1 v/est 55.97 feet
and North 33 degrees 25' V/est 46.70 feet from the Southeast corner
of Block 7, Amended Plat of Park City in Section 16, Township 2
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 61 degrees 10 f V/est 73.16 feet; thence North 2S degrees 50* V/est 123.59 feet; thence North 61 degrees 10* East 33.90
feet; thence North 23 degrees 50 ! West 30.00 feet; thence North
64 degrees 11 ! East 17.CO feet; thence South 43 degrees 13 1 East
56.50 feet; thence South 33 degrees 25 ! East 103.30 feet to the
point of beginning and being the sane property described in that
certain Quit Claim Deed from Summit County, grantor, to Gilbert
J. Kimball and Robert V. Kimball,grantors, iscorded in the records
of the Summit County Recorder on March 22, 1940, in Book G of
Quit Claim Deeds, P. 224, as Entry No. 66563 and described therein
as 93 feet by 77 feet on Block 53, Snyders Addition and bearing
Serial No. SA 343.
This Deed is executed and delivered to correct an error in
the description of the real property described in that certain
Quit Claim Deed executed by the iove named grantors on December 3
1976, in favor of the ebove named grantees and recorded in the
records of the Summit County Recorder on December 3, 1976, in Book
M-37,Page 497, thereof, being Entry No. 135034*
Signed and Acknowledged regularly.
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1

A

I don't remember.

2

Q

Did he make out a deed to you for this property

3

before he passed away?

4

A

No.

No.

5 I

Q

Did he have a will?

6

A

No.

Long before my brother died he said he had

nothing to do with this property.

7

He refused to pay any part

of the taxes on it, so we let the property go to taxes,

8

g I And we bought it back in my name,
10

J

M R S . KIMBALL:

And it was Judge Robert McCor.ouch,

U | who told us how to do it.
12 I
13

Q

(By Mr. Kinghorn)

Sometime ago, back after your

father bought this property where the warehouse w a s —

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

—where the stucco shed i s now; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Did he sell it or did you and your brother sell it

18

to a man named Sid Mulcock?

19

A

We put it up for security when we built the garage.

20

Q

Did you ever sign a warranty deed to Sid Mulcock

21

on that property?

22

A

What?

23

Q

Did you ever deed that property to Sid Mulcock?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

But you deeded it over to Sid Mulcock, didn f t you?

We put it up for security to Sid Mulcock.
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To Whom It May Concern:
I, Marion G. Fletcher, of Salt Lake City, Utah, do
hereby declare that I am the son of Roy Fletcher, formerly a
resident of Park City, Utah.

This document relates to property

of Roy Fletcher known as the Park Avenue property.
During the lifetime of my father, I had discussions
with him regarding this Park Avenue property and the use by him
of the adjacent Kimball property.

The legal description and a

pictorial survey of the Kimball property is displayed on the
page attached hereto.

My father acknowledged the ownership of

the Kimball property by Gilbert John Kimball and Maude S. Kimball, his wife, having stated that his vise of the roadways and
buildings and his use of the Kimball property was by pennission
of Gilbert J. Kimball under a revokable agreement my father had
worked out with him.

The above recitation has also always been

my understanding of the matter.
It was my father's understanding that at any time
Gilbert J. Kimball would request, the improvements placed on
the Kimball property would be subject to removal by my father
without compensation, and use of the Kimball property discontin
Dated this

£ (,

day of

Or. i\ /

MARION G. FLETCHER
Signed and delivered
in the presence of:

Y
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1 about this property that is involved in the litigation?
2

A

Now, shall I answer?

3

MR. FELTON:

Yes.

4

THE WITNESS:

5

MR. FELTON: Answer his question.

No, I didn't.
Have you talked

6 to Bob about it?
7

Q

(BY MR. KINGHORN)

Have you ever talked to Bob

8 about it?
9

A

I didn't but Gib did and repeated it to me.

10

Q

When did Gib tell you he had talked to Bob about

11 this property?
12

A

Well, it would be 1947.

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

They were living in California and they came back

15 to Utah on their vacation and they always dropped in to see
16 us.
17

Q

Did they drop in to see you in 194 7?

18

A

In Park City, yes, and I remember the date accurate PLY

19 because, as I told you before, I had been very ill in Holy
20 |Cross Hospital.
21

Q

I was recuperating and they came in to see me

Did you hear a discussion at that time between Gib

22 |and Robert, and Bob?
23

A

I did not hear it but Gib told me about it.

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

And Bob n e v e r r e f u t e d

it.

He came many t i m e s

until

21
EXHIBIT 10

1 his death.

Now, this is what Gilbert told me that Bob said.

2

Q

In 1947?

3

A

1947.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

He said, "Bob, I paid all the taxes on this

6 property for the last seven years.
7 half?"

Would you like to pay youij

And Bob said, "I don't want anything further to do

8 with Park City.
9 of there."

I am through with it.

And Gib said, "All right.

10 and have it done."

You get my name off
Let's go to Coalville

And Bob said, "I am on my vacation.

I am

11 not going to fool around with attorneys and all of that mess.'
12 He said, "I am not going to give one day of it.

Just take my

13 name off as best you can."
14

Q

Do you know if anything was done after that to get

15 Bob's name off?
16

A

When Gib—we had very little money.

They had a

17 salary.
18

Q

Okay.

Just tell me if anything was done after thatj

19 to get Bob's name off the title.
20

A

The taxes were not paid for five years.

21 "The Park Record" in California.
22 up for sale.

They took

They saw that property was

They did not try to retrieve it.

When it came

23 up for sale, I didn't want it to go and I bought—I sent the
24 check to Coalville and paid for it.

Park City was a ghost tov\jn,

25 it had no value then, and I think it was around $50.00, or

22

1 something, I don't remember.

And then they had, it was a

2 quit claim deed they gave to me.
3 to me.

I paid for it.

4 and Gib's too.

I thought it should have gorj*

Bob's name should have been off of it

But they had three years to redeem it.

5 had eight years, five years.

They

This was on a tax sale in "The

6 Park Record" that they took and three years later after the
7 quit claim deed came, they could have redeemed it.

They had

8 eight years to redeem that property if they had wanted it but
9 they didn't want it evidently.
10

Q

And so that is your recollection of h o w —

11

A

It is the truth.

12

Q

Okay.

The record, by the way, doesn't show anythirjg

13 like that happening.
I sent the check in1

14

A

I don't know why it shouldn't.

15

Q

Well, I am just telling you that in terms of what

16 is written down.
17

A

In 44 years they have not paid one cent of taxes.

18

Q

I understand that.

19

A

My taxes on that last year was $1,226.29.

20

Q

I understand that.

So it has been your understanding

21 since that—
22

A

23
24

It has been my knowledge.
MR. FELTON:

Q

Let him finish, Maud, please.

(BY MR. KINGHORN)

It has been your opinion, based

25 on what happened, that Robert Kimball's name has not been

23

